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Hackers Inject Crypto-Stealing Code Across 178 Organizations’ Websites Including HSBC
Hackers inject crypto-stealing code into 178 organizations’ websites via an Optimizely flaw, targeting wallet addresses and payment data.
Key points
- Hackers exploited an Optimizely account-signup flaw to inject malicious scripts into websites belonging to 178 organizations globally, including HSBC, BBC, CNN and Zoom.
- The code could replace crypto wallet addresses, inspect payment forms and collect some browser data, while affected websites were not necessarily directly breached.
- Optimizely removed the injected code and added safeguards, but the complete attack window, number of exposed visitors and total financial losses remain publicly unknown.
Hackers injected crypto-stealing code into Optimizely scripts loaded by 178 organizations’ websites, enabling address substitution and payment-card skimming. Affected organizations included HSBC, BBC, CNN and Zoom. A technical report said Optimizely traced the incident to its Experimentation account signup flow and removed the injected code. The attack used behavior associated with a clipboard hijacker, replacing crypto destinations before payments. The breach spread through a shared third-party web component rather than direct compromises of every affected organization.
Optimizely flaw turns trusted website scripts into an attack vector
Researchers found malicious additions inside Optimizely Project JavaScript, which customer sites can load into visitors’ browsers. The company said it secured affected accounts and added protections against unauthorized delivery, while the exact route used to gain write access across projects remains unclear. Similar software supply-chain attacks show the risk created when trusted dependencies distribute altered code. A single compromised service can expose many websites because browsers execute vendor-hosted scripts during normal page loading.

The payload searched pages for cryptocurrency addresses and could replace destinations in visible text, form fields and clipboard operations. Researchers found code to inspect payment forms for card numbers, expiry dates and security codes before attempting exfiltration. The script checked those data formats before collection attempts. The code targeted both crypto transfers and conventional payment information, expanding the potential impact beyond digital-asset users. The episode adds to recurring frontend supply-chain incidents involving externally delivered browser code.
The payload had limits. Cross-origin payment fields could not be read by the card skimmer, while HttpOnly cookies were inaccessible to ordinary JavaScript. Researchers documented conditional cookie collection, screenshots and an iOS exploit-kit branch, but evidence did not establish successful exploitation of a real iPhone or a new zero-day. Not every visitor or data field was necessarily exposed, and the number of affected people remains unknown. Crypto users face a related risk from address-replacement malware.
Optimizely said it removed the malicious code, secured affected accounts and added safeguards while monitoring it. Researchers recommended reviewing project code, permissions, tokens, integrations and credentials. Visitors who made payments on affected pages were advised to verify crypto destinations and monitor card statements. The total financial impact remains unknown, as do the complete attack window and number of visitors exposed. The incident shows how third-party website tooling can create broad security risk even without directly compromising an organization’s own servers.